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Market Failure and Japanese Farmland Rents 
P.J. Dawson
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Abstract 
Since the early-1950s, Japanese farmland rents have been regulated and a consensus emerged 
that rent control led to market failure. Hypothesising a rent-formation model where rents are 
determined by prices, this paper estimates a threshold autoregressive model which integrates 
three tests of market failure, namely, inefficiency, bias and asymmetry. There are four results. 
First, a long-run relationship exists between rents and prices, and the Japanese farmland 
rental market is efficient. Second, the rent-price elasticity is unity and the market is unbiased. 
Third, rents are Granger-caused by prices which supports the rent-formation model. Fourth, 
asymmetry exists where more rapid error-correction occurs immediately after policy reform 
when rent growth exceeds price growth by 3.6% or more, and rent control has benefitted 
tenants. 
Keywords: Farm rents and land prices, rent control, Japan, market failure, threshold 
autoregression, efficiency, asymmetric price adjustment, price/rent bias 
JEL Classifications: Q15, C32 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Japanese farmland rental market was reformed after the Second World War as 
part of the transformation from feudalism to democracy. Three important aspects of this 
reform were that rents were reduced, rent-in-kind was transformed into money rent, and 
'owner-cultivators' were created (Koppel and Kim, 1993). The main instrument of reform was 
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the Agricultural Land Law (1952) which inter alia had power to control maximum rents. 
Rent control was revised in 1967 and abolished in 1970 although it was still applied to 
existing agreements until 1980. Since 1970, a more limited form of rent control has been 
exercised by local Chambers of Agriculture which oversee rents and exert influence when 
they are regarded as too high (Sekiya, 2002). By contrast, farmland prices have not been 
directly controlled although agricultural land is not allowed to convert to other uses to 
prevent speculation. Honma (1994), Egaitsu and Shogenji (1995) and Kusakari (1998) argue 
that rent control protects tenants against rent rises; the Japanese farmland rental market 
therefore is inefficient and there is market failure.
2
 A counterview is that rent control restricts 
short-run attempts by landowners to raise rents above the efficient, long-run equilibrium 
level, and rent control may have improved market efficiency rather than exacerbated it. 
Whether the Japanese farmland rental market is inefficient therefore is unclear.  
 
Empirical evidence on the existence of market failure is mixed. Shigeto et al. (2008) 
use national data for 1955-2000 and standard cointegration methods to estimate a rent-
formation model where rent is set as a simple mark-down on price through a process of 
institutional governance.
3
 They focus on two aspects of market failure and test for market 
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 The market is further distorted: before 1970, terminating tenancy contracts was difficult 
because permission of the governor of the perfecture was required; and since 1970, 
landowners could only terminate contracts that had lasted at least 10 years. 
3
 Most of the empirical literature on the farmland rent-price relationship elsewhere is based 
on the present valuation model whereby rent determines price. The model hypothesises that 
price is equal to the capitalised value of future income streams or rent, that is,                   
    ∑  
  
            where Pt is the price at the beginning of time period t, Rt is rent in 
period t,  is a constant discount factor equal to 1/(1+i) where i is the real discount rate, and 
Et is the conditional expectations operator based on information available at time t. A 
constant expected discount rate is commonly assumed which implies that there is a long-run 
relationship between price and rent, that is, p=0+1r where p=lnP*, r=lnR*, ln is the natural 
logarithm, P* and R* are the long-run equilibrium price and a constant expectation of 
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efficiency when rents and prices are cointegrated, and unbiasness when the rent-price 
elasticity is unity (Kellard, 2002).
4
 There are four results. First, rents and prices are 
cointegrated and the Japanese farmland rental market is efficient. Second, prices Granger-
cause rents which supports the rent-formation model. Third, the rent-price elasticity is unity 
and the market is unbiased. Fourth, there is a structural break in the rent-price relationship in 
1980 when the rent/price ratio rose as maximum rents were finally abolished. By contrast, 
Sanjuán et al. (2009) use panel cointegration methods and regional data for 1955-2000. Their 
results show evidence of cointegrating relationships in each region with structural breaks in 
both 1967 and 1980, prices Granger-cause rents which again supports the rent-formation 
model, and rents are inelastic with respect to price which implies market bias and rent control 
favours tenants.  
 
The rent-formation models estimated by Shigeto et al. (2008) and Sanjuán et al. 
(2009) hypothesise symmetric price transmission where a rent rise following a price increase 
is the same absolute magnitude as a rent fall following a corresponding price decrease, and 
where the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium is the same in each case. A third 
dimension of market failure is asymmetric adjustment of rents to prices and there are two 
reasons why asymmetry may exist. First and drawing on Currie (1981, pp.87-99), asymmetry 
may arise because of land fixity, the relative bargaining strengths of landowners and tenants 
and asymmetric information, and large landowners with many tenants are able to exploit local 
monopoly power. Rents therefore are 'sticky' in a downwards direction with rents rising faster 
than they fall. By contrast, rents maybe 'sticky' in an upwards direction when long leases exist 
                                                                                                                                                        
equilibrium rent, =1 and =ln(1/i). Empirical applications include Falk (1991), Lloyd et al. 
(1991), Lloyd (1994) and Lence and Miller (1999). 
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and rent rises are slower than rent falls: tenant farmers suffer when there is an unanticipated 
fall in commodity prices and they seek immediate rent reductions; conversely, landowners 
suffer when there is an unanticipated rise in commodity prices since they have to wait for 
contracts to expire before rents can be increased. A second reason for asymmetry is the 
efficacy of rent control before 1980 under the Agricultural Land Law and thereafter from the 
activities of the Chambers of Agriculture. Any difference between this efficacy and the speed 
at which landowners can increase short-run rents above their efficient, long-run equilibrium 
level can lead to asymmetric rent adjustment. 
 
This paper re-examines the farmland rent-price relationship in Japan using the rent-
formation model of Shigeto et al. (2008). By contrast to previous studies, we test for three 
aspects of market failure, namely inefficiency, bias and asymmetry, within the integrated 
empirical framework of Enders and Siklos (2001). Evidence of market failure has 
implications about the effects of rent control. If the farmland rental market is inefficient, there 
is no long-run relationship between rents and prices, and price does not determine rent. If the 
market is biased, rent changes more or less than proportionately in response to a price 
change, and rent control favours either landowners or tenants. Third, asymmetry implies that 
adjustment when rents are too high is either more or less rapid than adjustment when rents are 
too low. If adjustment is more rapid when rents are too high than when they are too low, rent 
control favours tenants; otherwise, landowners are favoured. The paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 provides some background on incorporating asymmetry into a 
cointegration framework which is a key focus, Section 3 discusses the empirical model and 
method, Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Asymmetric Price Transmission: A Selected Review 
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There is a growing literature on asymmetric price transmission although there appears 
to be none on farmland markets. Much is concerned with agricultural markets although other 
lines of inquiry include pricing behaviour in fuel/energy and financial markets. Meyer and 
von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) and Frey and Manera (2007) review econometric models and 
the former also survey some applications, particularly in agriculture. It is not the intention to 
replicate these reviews, but rather to provide some background to the case at hand. 
 
Price transmission examines the relationship between prices either at different stages 
of the marketing chain or between spatially separated markets. Consider a linear relationship 
between two prices, p1 and p2: 
 
                     (1) 
 
where 0and 1 are parameters and p1 is a mark-up on p2. Asymmetric price response is 
concerned with either the magnitude of price transmission and/or the speed of adjustment 
(Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). Magnitude symmetry is where  is the same 
value for an increase in p2 as for a corresponding fall, whereas magnitude asymmetry is 
where  differs between these two cases. Asymmetric adjustment on the other hand is where 
p1 reacts more rapidly to an increase in p2 than to a fall, or vice versa. If p1 rises faster when 
p2 increases than when p2 falls, p1 is 'sticky' in a downwards direction and this is 'positive 
asymmetric price transmission' (Peltzman, 2000) which is referred to in the informal 
literature as 'rockets and feathers'.  
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Early work on asymmetric relationships, particularly by Tweeten and Quance (1969), 
Wolffram (1971) and Houck (1977), examines magnitude asymmetry in agricultural supply 
response while later studies including Boyd and Brorsen (1988), Bailey and Brorsen (1989) 
and Mohanty et al. (1995) consider magnitude asymmetric price transmission. The notion of 
magnitude asymmetry however is criticised by von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1996) and by 
von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) because it may produce spurious regression results or is 
incompatible with cointegration. Specifically, no unique long-run relationship can exist 
because magnitude asymmetry implies a permanent difference between positive and negative 
periods of transmission, and there are two long-run relationships, one when p2 is rising and 
the other when p2 is falling. Accordingly, more recent literature focuses on asymmetric 
adjustment towards long-run equilibrium within a cointegration framework. Building on 
Tsay's (1989) threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, threshold cointegration models allow 
the speed of adjustment to differ depending on whether the deviation from long-run 
equilibrium is above or below a threshold. Examples include Balke and Fomby (1997), Engle 
and Granger (1998), Enders and Siklos (2001), Hansen and Seo (2003), and Greb et al. 
(2013).  
 
Threshold cointegration methods have been used to examine price transmission at 
different stages of the marketing food chain. For example, Goodwin and Holt (1999) and 
Goodwin and Harper (2000) examine US wholesale-retail prices relationships for beef and 
pork respectively and both find that shocks are unidirectional from wholesale to retail prices. 
In addition, the former find modest asymmetry while the latter find varying asymmetric 
strengths. More evidence of asymmetry is found by Cramon-Taubadel (1998) between 
German producer and wholesale pork prices, by Abdulai (2002) between Swiss producer and 
retail pork prices, by Alemu and Ogundeji (2010) between South African producer and retail 
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food prices, and by Falkowski (2010) between Polish producer and retail liquid milk prices. 
In each case, an increase in the producer price that squeezes the margin is transmitted faster 
to the wholesale/retail price than is a decrease in the producer price that increases the margin.  
 
Evidence of asymmetric price transmission in spatially separated agricultural markets 
is mixed. For example, Abdulai (2000) finds that wholesale maize prices in local markets in 
Ghana respond faster to increases in the central market price than to decreases. Subervie 
(2011) estimates relationships between producer coffee prices in El Salvador, India and 
Colombia and world prices and finds that positive asymmetry is replaced by negative 
asymmetry conditional on domestic liberalisation reforms. By contrast, little evidence of 
asymmetry is found by von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1996) in bivariate relationships 
between the US wheat price and corresponding prices in Argentina, Australia, Canada and 
the EU, and by Goodwin and Piggott (2001) for US corn and soybean prices in local and 
central markets. 
 
Other econometric methods have also been used to examine asymmetric price 
transmission and examples include Serra and Goodwin (2003) and Awokuse and Wang 
(2009). The former apply threshold vector error-correction models and find asymmetric 
bivariate relationships between farm and retail prices for various dairy products in Spain. The 
latter apply threshold TAR cointegration models to examine producer-retail price 
relationships for US butter, cheese, and liquid milk, and there is strong evidence of 
asymmetry for butter and liquid milk but not for cheese. 
 
Overall, there is much evidence of both symmetric and asymmetric price 
transmission. Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) observe almost equal conclusions in 
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205 tests reviewed, but of the 10 tests that use threshold cointegration models, eight reject 
symmetry which suggests that asymmetry is perhaps more easily identified by such methods.  
 
3.  Empirical Model and Method 
Adapting (1), Shigeto et al. (2008) propose a simple rent-formation model where 
farmland rent is set in accordance with land price:  
 
                   t=1,…,n     (2) 
 
where rt is the rent paid in period t, pt is the price at the beginning of time period t, rt and pt 
are defined in natural logarithms, and ut is an error term. A priori, we expect that 0<0 and 
1>0. Define market efficiency where rt and pt are cointegrated, while rents are unbiased if 
1=1 where a 1% increase in price leads to a 1% increase in rent. 
 
  Standard econometric models of cointegrated variables are those of Engle and 
Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988).
5
 These methods assume that adjustment is symmetric, 
that is, the speed of adjustment from disequilibrium is linear, and positive and negative errors 
induce the same speed of adjustment back to long-run equilibrium. Consider the Engle-
Granger method. Conditional on rt and pt being non-stationary I(1) variables, the long-run 
relationship in (2) is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). If ut (which may be serially 
correlated) is stationary, that is I(0), then rt and pt are cointegrated and a long-run relationship 
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 Shigeto et al. (2008) use Johansen et al.'s (2000) method which extends Johansen (1988) to 
permit structural breaks. 
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exists between them. The null of no cointegration between rt and pt is tested by testing the 
stationarity of ut using: 
 
              ∑   
   
                  (3) 
 
where    are the errors in (2) and vt is a white noise error term. Lagged values of     may be 
added to (3) to ensure that vt approximates white noise. The null of a unit root and thus of no 
cointegration is 1=0. If <0,    is stationary and rt and pt are cointegrated and the Granger 
representation theorem implies that a corresponding error-correction model (ECM) exists 
(Engle and Granger, 1987).  
 
Engle-Granger's test of no cointegration is mis-specified if adjustment is not 
symmetric and Enders and Siklos (2001) extend the model to admit asymmetric threshold 
adjustment. They develop two cointegration models, namely a threshold autoregressive 
(TAR) model and a momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) model. In the TAR model, 
(3) is replaced by: 
 
               (    )     ∑   
   
               (4) 
 
where It is the Heaviside indicator which depends on the level of     : 
 
    {
            
           
         (5) 
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and  is the value of the threshold. It is sometimes reasonable to set =0 in (5) so that 
adjustment is        if      is above its long-run equilibrium value and is        if      is 
below its long-run equilibrium value. Thus,    is permitted to exhibit more momentum in one 
direction than the other. For example, if |1|>|2|, adjustment from positive values of      is 
more rapid than adjustment from corresponding negative values. Alternatively if 1=2, the 
Engle-Granger model in (2) and (3) is nested in the TAR model of (2), (4) and (5). The M-
TAR model is similar to the TAR model except that the Heaviside indicator depends upon the 
change in     , and (5) is replaced by: 
 
    {
             
            
.         (6) 
 
Here, adjustment is        if      ≥τ, and is        if      <τ. Again, it may be reasonable 
to set =0 in (6) but the more general case is where  is unconstrained and it needs to be 
estimated. Enders and Siklos recommend a search over possible thresholds lying in the 
middle 70% of the range of    , and  is chosen to minimise the residual sum of squares. 
 
In both TAR and M-TAR models, necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
stationarity of ut in (4) when rt and pt are cointegrated are that 1<0,2<0 and (1+1)(1+2)<1 
for any value of , which imply that ut=0 is the long-run equilibrium value of the system. If rt 
and pt are not cointegrated, there is no threshold, τ, and 1=0 and/or2=0. Enders and Siklos 
propose two tests of the null of no cointegration where the alternative is cointegration with 
asymmetry where ut~I(0), and 1<0 and 2<0 in (4). The first is the t-Max test. Denoting the 
larger of the t-statistics associated with 1 and2 as t-Max, the null is either that 1=0 or that 
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2=0. Second, the Φ-statistic tests the joint null that 1=2=0. Both tests have non-standard 
distributions and Enders and Siklos provide critical values from Monte Carlo experiments. 
They also argue that the Φ-statistic has more power and is preferred. 
 
The corresponding short-run ECM for rents in both TAR and M-TAR models is: 
 
                   (    )     ∑    
   
         ∑    
   
           . (7) 
 
Lagged values of rt and pt are added to (7) to ensure that the error term, t, approximates 
white noise. In (7), 1 is the speed of adjustment when disequilibrium is above the threshold, 
and for the TAR (M-TAR) model this is when        (       ) when long-run rents are 
too high. Similarly, 2 is the speed of adjustment coefficient when disequilibrium is below 
the threshold, and for the TAR (M-TAR) model this is when        (       ) when 
long-run rents are too low. Positive discrepancies from long-run equilibrium are shorter lived 
in the M-TAR model.  
 
4.  Data and Results 
National average farmland rents and prices from actual transactions are not available. 
Instead, annual surveys of rents and prices are carried-out by the Japan Real Estate Institute 
on a particular census day (31 March) whereby questionnaires are administered to 
agricultural experts employed at municipal halls or belonging to agricultural councils 
including Chambers of Agriculture. Rents are from farmland leases, and prices are for owner-
cultivated farmland from sales. One-season farmland leases, orchards, tea plantations, and 
mulberry fields are excluded. The sample period is 1955-2010 (56 observations) and these 
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data are the most consistent and longest time series of national farmland rents and prices 
available. Nominal average rents and prices (yen/10are, where 100are=1hectare) are deflated 
by the GDP deflator and are for 'good' paddy and vegetable fields. They are shown in Figure 
1 and co-movement is apparent..  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) are used to test for unit 
roots in rt and pt. The number of lags in each equation, with a maximum of four, is chosen 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Test statistics when a trend is included in each 
equation are -1.36 for rt and -1.18 for pt (critical value at the 90% confidence level: -3.15) 
while corresponding statistics from non-trended equations are -1.78 and -1.39 (critical value: 
-2.58). The null of a unit root in each case is not rejected irrespective of whether a trend is 
included or not and both rt and pt are non-stationary I(1) variables. 
 
The long-run relationship in (2) is common to the Engle-Granger, TAR and M-TAR 
models and the OLS estimate is: 
 
rt = -6.694 + 1.186pt +  ̂   R
2
=0.76, D.W.=0.29   (8) 
 
The residuals,  ̂ , from (8) are used to test the null of no cointegration in all three models and 
the results are shown in Table 1. In each case, the AIC indicates that three lags are 
appropriate. The Engle-Granger cointegration test statistic is t=-2.43 (critical value at 90% 
confidence interval: c.v.=-2.45 (MacKinnon, 1994)), and the null of no cointegration between 
rt and pt is not rejected. In the TAR model in (4) and (5), we test the null of no cointegration 
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with =0. Point estimates of 1 and 2 imply that there is convergence of rents towards long-
run equilibrium after a shock to price, but Φ=2.89 (c.v.=5.22) and t-Max=-1.84 (c.v.=-1.89) 
and the null is not rejected. Next, we test the null of no cointegration in the M-TAR model in 
(4) and (6) with =0. Point estimates of 1 and 2 again imply convergence. The conclusions 
from the Φ-statistic and the t-Max test are mutually reinforcing: Φ=4.08 (c.v.=5.32) while t-
Max=-1.83 (c.v.=-1.84) and null is again not rejected. Finally, we test the null of no 
cointegration in the M-TAR model in (4) and (6) without restricting . A search grid yields 
=0.036, and point estimates of 1 and 2 imply convergence. The conclusions from the Φ-
statistic and the t-Max test are again mutually reinforcing but here, Φ=6.13 (c.v.=5.99) and t-
Max=-1.97 (c.v.=-1.72), the null of no cointegration is rejected, and the farmland market is 
efficient. AICs indicate that the more general M-TAR model with an unrestricted threshold, 
, best fits the data.6 In this preferred model, the null that 1=2 is rejected and symmetric 
adjustment in the Engle-Granger model is not supported.  
 
Diagnostic mis-specification tests are also shown in Table 1. Denote the Breusch-
Godfrey test for fourth-order serial correlation by      
  (Greene, 2012, pp.316-317), Engle's 
test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity of order four by      
  (Greene, pp.976-
977), White's test for heteroscedasticity by     
  (Greene, pp.315-316), and Doornik and 
Hansen's (2008) normality test by Ep. Tests in all equations suggest generally well-specified 
models although non-normality is evident and statistical tests need to be treated with caution. 
The preferred M-TAR model with ≠0 (Table 1, fifth column) implies that a long-run 
relationship exists between rents and prices and that adjustment to long-run equilibrium is 
                                                 
6
 This pattern of cointegration between the four models is similar to that of Enders and Siklos 
who examine bivariate relationships between US interest rates. 
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asymmetric. Since the null that 1=2 is rejected and |1|>|2|, the speed of adjustment to 
positive discrepancies from long-run equilibrium when   ̂   ≥0.036 is more rapid than 
adjustment to negative discrepancies when   ̂   <0.036.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Speeds of adjustment of rents to price shocks are contained in the ECM for rent in (7). 
AICs rise as the number of lags increase to four but both the Schwarz Bayesian and Hannan-
Quinn criteria indicate one lag and the estimated ECM for rent is: 
 
                    ̂         (    ) ̂                            ̂   (9)
 (0.10)     (-2.37)              (-1.65)                       (1.92)              (1.06)    
   
R
2
=0.27; F4,49=4.55 [0.00]; D.W.=2.01;  
     
 =8.12 [0.09];      
 =0.27 [0.99];     
 =49.31 [0.24]; Ep=24.82 [0.00] 
(t-statistics in parentheses; p-values in square brackets) 
 
Diagnostic mis-specification tests suggest that (9) is reasonably well-specified although non-
normality is evident. Following Enders (2010, pp.365-371), we test the null of no Granger-
causality where both speed of adjustment coefficients and pt-1 do not enter the rt-equation. 
The test statistic is F3,49=4.03 (p-value: 0.01) and we conclude that rt is Granger-caused by pt. 
In the ECM for pt which is not reported, there is evidence of non-normality but the null of 
no Granger-causality yields F3,49=0.75 (p-value: 0.53) and there is strong evidence that rt 
does not Granger-cause pt. We conclude that pt is weakly exogenous and there is support for 
the rent-formation model. 
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We also test for two structural breaks, in 1967 when the maximum rent for new rental 
agreements was revised, and in 1980 when maximum rents were abolished. In the preferred 
M-TAR model, two dummy variables for 1969-1980 and 1981-2010 are included in (4); 
testing the joint significance of the associated parameters yields F3,49=0.08 (p-value: 0.92) 
and there is no evidence of breaks. Finally, we test the null of unbiasness, that is 1=1 in (8). 
Following Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993), the long-run relationship is 
estimated by dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) where (8) is augmented by lags and 
leads. Admitting autocorrelation up to order two and lags and leads up to three, AICs suggest 
that correcting for first-order autocorrelation and two lags/leads is appropriate. The Wald 
statistic is   
 = 0.17 (p-value: 0.68) and the null is not rejected. Thus, the Japanese farmland 
rental market is unbiased and a 1% increase in the price leads to a 1% increase in rents in the 
long run.
7
 
 
Speeds of adjustment of rents towards long-run equilibrium following price shocks 
are indicated by the estimates of 1 and 2 in (9) and are illustrated in Figure 2. For positive 
discrepancies from long-run equilibrium when   ̂   ≥0.036, 48% of the adjustment to long-
run equilibrium takes place in the first year, 93% of full adjustment is complete by the end of 
fourth year, and full adjustment is complete by the end of ninth year. For negative 
discrepancies from long-run equilibrium when   ̂   <0.036, only 15% of the adjustment to 
long-run equilibrium takes place in the first year, 49% of full adjustment is complete by the 
                                                 
7
 The specification of the rent-formation model in (2) is parsimonious and asymmetry may be 
the result of omitted variables, particularly the real interest rate. To test this hypothesis, (2) is 
augmented by the real interest rate and the significance of its associated parameter is tested 
using DOLS with data for 1961-2010. Correcting for second-order autocorrelation with one 
lag/lead, the Wald statistic is   
 = 0.06 (p-value: 0.81), and there is no evidence that the real 
interest rate determines rent. Thus, the simple rent-formation model in (2) appears 
reasonable. 
16 
 
end of the fourth year, and full adjustment takes 32 years.
8
 Thus, the speed of adjustment 
resulting from positive discrepancies from long-run equilibrium is more rapid than 
adjustment from corresponding negative discrepancies. Figure 3 shows the estimated changes 
in the residuals,   ̂ , and =0.036, and more rapid adjustment when   ̂   ≥0.036 occurs in 
1969, 1972 and 1982-84 which follows the policy reforms in 1967, 1970 and 1980, while 
adjustment is slower when policy is unchanged when   ̂   <0.036. The findings of 
efficiency and unbiasness, where 1=1, and the preference for the M-TAR model imply that 
the adjustment of rents to long-run equilibrium from above (when rents are too high and 
  ̂   ≥0.036) occurs when rt-1-pt-1≥0.036. Conversely, if rents are too low and 
  ̂   <0.036, then rt-1-pt-1<0.036. Thus, more rapid adjustment occurs when rent growth 
exceeds price growth by 3.6% or more. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
5.  Conclusions 
This paper examines the farmland rent-price relationship in Japan using national data 
for 1955-2010 and Shigeto et al.'s (2008) rent-formation model. The aim is to examine 
market failure, and in particular to test for inefficiency, bias and asymmetry. There are four 
results. First, rents and prices are cointegrated, a long-run relationship exists between them 
and the Japanese farmland rental market is efficient. Second, rents are Granger-caused by 
prices. These two findings confirm those of both Shigeto et al. (2008) and Sanjuán et al. 
                                                 
8
 A caveat is that adjustment coefficients have poor small-sample properties (Hansen, 1997; 
and Enders et al. (2007)). 
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(2009) and they support the rent-formation model.
9
 Third, the Japanese farmland rental 
market is unbiased and a 1% increase in the farmland price leads to a 1% increase in rents. 
This concurs with Shigeto et al. but contrasts with Sanjuán et al. who find an inelastic rent-
price relationship and market bias. These different findings arise from different data, different 
samples and different empirical methods.  
 
A third dimension of market failure not addressed elsewhere is asymmetry and our 
fourth result is that there is evidence of asymmetric adjustment of rents to prices where a 
momentum threshold autoregressive model best describes the data. In particular, there is 
positive asymmetric transmission where adjustment from positive discrepancies from long-
run equilibrium is more rapid than adjustment from negative discrepancies. For the former, 
48% of the adjustment to long-run equilibrium takes place each year and full adjustment 
takes nine years; while for the latter, only 15% of the adjustment takes place each year, and 
full adjustment takes over 30 years. Moreover, the adjustment of rent to a price shock is more 
rapid when rent growth exceeds price growth by 3.6% or more. Japanese farmland policy 
reforms were implemented in 1967, 1970 and 1980, and periods of more rapid adjustment 
occur two years later than each reform and were short-lived. Following the more substantive 
reforms, land prices rose by 9% in 1968, and by 10% over the three years 1981-83 and these 
compare with an average growth rate of 0.8% per annum over the sample period. Uncertainty 
about the effects of these reforms, combined with land fixity, the relative bargaining strengths 
of landowners and tenants and asymmetric information, allowed landowners to exploit 
monopoly power and there were substantial increases in rent of 42% in 1968 and 69% during 
                                                 
9
 Shigeto et al. (2008) and Sanjuán et al. (2009) use samples for 1955-2000. The longer 
sample used here for 1955-2010 do not disturb their conclusion that rents are Granger-caused 
by prices. 
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1981-83 which compare with an average annual growth rate of 0.5%. With respect to the 
current policy regime, the Chambers of Agriculture appeared slow in adjusting to the reform 
of 1980: as statutory rent control was relaxed, rents increased rapidly but then the Chambers 
exerted increasing influence and imposed rapid, downward pressure countervailing the 
monopoly power initially enjoyed by landowners. Since the mid-1980s, rents and prices have 
been more aligned: they are relatively stable with low (mainly negative) growth rates, rent 
growth is below price growth, and adjustment has been slower.  
 
In summary, we find no evidence that the Japanese farmland rental market is 
inefficient or biased. However, market failure is present in the form of asymmetric 
adjustment of rents to price shocks and rent control is faster at smoothing-out large increases 
in rents than it is at smoothing-out large decreases. Rent control has been beneficial to tenant 
farmers and detrimental to landowners. 
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Table 1: Tests of Non-Cointegration 
 Engle-Granger TAR 
(τ=0) 
M-TAR 
(τ=0) 
M-TAR 
(τ≠0) 
1 -0.208 
(-2.43) 
-0.214 
(-1.87) 
-0.416 
(-2.51) 
-0.606 
(-3.28) 
2 - -0.203 
(-1.84) 
-0.164 
(-1.83) 
-0.165 
(-1.97) 
1 0.408 
(2.85) 
0.408 
(2.82) 
0.473 
(3.19) 
0.528 
(3.63) 
2 -0.160 
(-1.12) 
-0.160 
(-1.11) 
-0.150 
(-1.07) 
-0.119 
(-0.87) 
3 0.274 
(1.92) 
0.274 
(1.90) 
0.376 
(2.39) 
0.348 
(2.50) 
τ - 0 0 0.036 
AIC -5.66 -5.66 -5.71 -5.78 
t-Max - -1.84 -1.83 -1.97 
Φ - 2.89 4.08 6.13 
1=2 - 0.01 
[0.93] 
2.13 
[0.15] 
5.78 
[0.02] 
     
  
 
2.72 
[0.60] 
5.58 
[0.23] 
3.97 
[0.41] 
1.95 
[0.74] 
     
  
 
0.38 
[0.98] 
0.37 
[0.98] 
0.34 
[0.99] 
0.27 
[0.99] 
    
  
 
6.46 
[0.69] 
10.16 
[0.68] 
15.29 
[0.29] 
11.04 
[0.61] 
Ep 23.12 
[0.00] 
23.16 
[0.00] 
24.06 
[0.00] 
24.82 
[0.00] 
Notes:  1. t-statistics in parentheses; and  
 2. p-values in square brackets. 
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Figure 1: Farmland Rents and Prices in Japan (1955-2010) 
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Figure 2: Adjustment of Rents to Shocks in Price 
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